Bolivia's Growing Regional ConflictJames S. Henry and Donald K. Ranvaud

The new year is already off to a turbulent start in Bolivia. During the week of January 7 to 15, up to six thousands supporters of President Evo Morales' MAS party-- mainly cocaleros from the Chapare coca-growing region,  campesinos, and indigenous groups --  showed up in Cochabamba,  Bolivia's third largest city of 800,000,  in the country's center. 

They had come to demand the resignation of Cochabamba's   right-wing Governor, Manfred Villa-Reyes, who has become an outspoken supporter of the "autonomista" movement,  which is seeking greater "states rights" for the country's nine provinces -- especially the wealthier, "whiter" eastern and southern provinces of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija, where most of Bolivia's natural gas and richest farms are located.

As shown in this exclusive video footage from Cochabamba (See Parts I and Part II). shot by Bolivian film crews working under the direction of  our colleague, award-winning Hollywood producer Donald K.Ranvaud (The Constant Gardener, City of God, Central Station, etc.), the MAS supporters encountered a fierce reaction from the city's middle-class residents and pro-autonomista forces, including a crowd of more than well-organized thousand stick-waiving people who reportedly attacked the cocaleros and campesinos aggressively on January 13th. In the ensuing conflict, at least two people were killed and more than 150 were injured.

By Saturday January 14th, calm had returned to the city. Governor Manfred returned from Santa Cruz, where he had apparently fled out of concerns for his own safety, and  Evo Morales also returned from Nicaragua, where he had been attending Daniel Ortega's inauguration. Steps have been taken on all sides to pacify the situation.

However, as we'll discuss below, the potential for renewed conflict is very high. This is not only because none of the fundamental economic and political causes of the conflict have been addressed. It is also because on all sides,  Bolivia's political leaders have not exactly shown the capacity for compromise and the maturity that will be essential to avoid a "lose lose" outcome for Bolivians of all backgrounds and social classes.   

ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

Regional tensions have been building up in Boivia for at least two decades. The potential for regional conflict is explosive because it is closely aligned with so many other deep-seated social fault-lines – for example, the distribution of natural wealth; poverty and education; the concentration of organized communities like the cocaleros, indigenous groups, and obreros; and the distribution of support for political parties and mass organizations like PODEMOS, Manfred Reyes-Vlla’s NFR, and “Nacion Camba” on the Right, and MAS, the cocaleros, the campesinos, the Central Obreros, and the social movements on the Left.

One crucial ingredient in this problem is that Bolivia’s most valuable natural resources, arable land and natural gas (and the refineries, pipelines and agribusiness facilities needed to exploit them), are concentrated in Bolivia’s wealthier eastern and southern states – especially Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando. Together these states account for just 30 percent of Bolivia’s population, but two-thirds of its natural wealth. While MAS has captured a third of the vote in Santa Cruz, Evo’s poorer, more indigenous (“Kolla”) base is much stronger in the five western states. (In the state of Cochabamba, a key battleground in the recent crisis, Evo’s party controls 12 out of 14 provinces, and has been pressing hard to oust the rightist Governor, Manfred Villa-Reyes.

RECENT FACTORS

The regional conflict has recently come to a head for several reasons.

First, since his election in December 2005,  Evo Morales has been asserting greater federal control over land, natural gas, and tax revenues. He has also renegotiated Bolivia’s gas export contracts with Brazil and Argentina, already tripling the revenue that the country realizes from its gas exports. Under Bolivia’s current federal system, at least 40 percent of this increased revenue will go to the states.

Ironically enough, therefore, the “Camba” states – which were historically always heavily subsidized by the “Kolla” ones, before gas and soybeans took off in the 1970s and 1980s -- have already benefited from MAS’ new economic policies. But the increased value of their mineral wealth has not led the Camba states to support Evo – if anything, it has increased their willingness to consider secession.

Second, Evo has also launched a tough new anti-corruption campaign – one of the most aggressive in Latin America. Focused on increased transparency and accountability for government spending, this is intended to address the long-standing popular conviction that a large share of the Bolivian Treasury ends up benefiting powerful private interests. It is also designed to insure that any increased gas revenues will be used wisely. The program is very popular with ordinary Bolivians, but it has not won Evo many friends among the state bureaucracies, the diplomatic corps, and politicians – for example, Governors like Manfred, who has often been accused of corruption, as well as being a lackey of former President Goni Sanchez de Losada -- whose extradition from the US on "genocide" charges is about to be requested by Evo's government.

Third, in August 2006, Evo convened a “Constituent Assembly” to rewrite Bolivia’s constitution – another key MAS commitment. But when the delegates to the CA were elected, MAS failed to win the 2/3rds needed to control it. So the CA has bogged down in procedural fights, with PODEMOS and other center-right parties blocking efforts to permit majority rule.

Finally, partly in response to these MAS initiatives, the autonomistas have become much more aggressive and well-organized – some say, with outside support. Key politicians on the Right (especially “Colonel” Manfred) have seized the opportunity to make a national name for themselves.

In July 2006, Bolivia held a national referendum on whether or not to grant more power over revenues and spending to the country’s nine departments. The autonomistas, the referendum’s supporters, lost by a wide margin.

Despite this loss, in December, six of the country’s nine governors -- Manfred, the four Camba state governors, and Jose Luis Paredes, La Paz’ non-MAS Governor -- all met in La Paz and demanded yet another (costly referendum on autonomy.

In January 2007 this triggered the massive confrontation noted above. Reportedly encouraged by Evo -- and perhaps also aided by support and organization from Venezuela -- more than 6000 of Evo’s supporters – mainly “cocaleros,” coca growers, and the members of the Central Obreras Regional, the country’s key labor union – assembled in Cochabamba to demand Governor Manfred’s resignation.

Manfred fled to Santa Cruz, but many of his middle-class supporters stayed behind and engaged in sharp street battles with the cocaleros. The ranks of Manfred’s supporters included a band of more than a thousand stick-wavers who attacked the cocaleros with paramilitary-like discipline. At least three of those arrested were carrying guns and long knives – including one fellow who was ominously (or perhaps just fortuitously) named “Banzer” – like Bolivia right-wing dictator in the 1970s. At least two people were killed (one on each side of the confrontation) and more than 150 injured in the ensuing confrontation on January 13.

SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

No one emerges from this conflict entirely with clean hands. On the Left, key leaders like Oscar Olivares and Edgar Patano have supported the use of organized mass demonstrations almost as if the MAS could not rely on normal legal and electoral processes. Evo failed to discourage his supporters from occupying Cochabamba and demanding Manfred’s resignation – despite the fact that Manfred had of course been legally elected in 2005, and that while his call for a second referendum may have bee provocative, it was not illegal. Once the conflict started, Evo also took his time returning from Daniel Ortega’s inauguration in Nicaragua. He didn’t arrive in Cochabamba until January 14, after the violence had already subsided. Once there, he didn’t advise his followers to disband, much less retract their demands for Manfred’s resignation.

On the Right, the autonomistas and their political allies, especially Manfred, Paredes, and the four Camba governors, have been very provocative. Their incendiary demands for separatism, their demand for another regional referendum, and their refusal to compromise on CA voting procedures have not been helpful. Even more disturbing, the willingness of at least some autonomistas to organize armed groups and attack MAS demonstrators indicates a potential for escalation.

WAYS FORWARD?

There are now signs that both sides in this conflict are trying to step back from the precipice, at least for the moment. With the Bolivian Army’s help, peace has returned to Cochabamba. Manfred has withdrawn his call for a second referendum. As a way of defusing the demand for his resignation, Evo’s party has introduced an emergency bill in Congress calling for a referendum revocatorio, requiring Bolivia’s entire class of elected officials -- mayors, governors, ministers, and even the President himself – to submit to periodic referenda on their performance, should they be accused of corruption, mishandling cash, human rights violations, or the failure to fulfill electoral promises. Evo’s Vice President, Alvaro Garcia Linares, has reaffirmed Manfred’s authority, and offered to guarantee his safety.

Still, the demands for the resignations of Manfred and Paredes have continued. Paredes has threatened that he and all the Camba state governors would all resign together if Manfred were forced to go. While peace has been restored, thousands of social movement activists are still very agitated.

More important, none of the fundamental issues underlying this conflict have really been resolved. So the situation remains a power keg, with social peace owing a great deal to the presence – and continued neutrality – of the Army.

Overall, while the chances for a full-scale civil war here appear to be limited, this could easily turn out to be a classic “lose-lose” situation – especially if extremists on the Right (and Left) abandon their commitment to democratic procedures. The sudden, sharp escalation of this conflict in early January underscored the immaturity of Bolivia’s entire political leadership, and the precarious state of its democracy.

On the other hand, as is often the case when decisive historical turning points are reached, this crisis might just possibly turn out to be constructive.

If, for example, Bolivia’s leaders can seize the moment and achieve breakthroughs on some of their key issues, like revenue-sharing, corruption, CA governance, and the role of popular referendums, they may be able to achieve some political innovations that will be of great interest to other Latin America democracies, as well as the rest of us.

After all, despite centuries of oppression and brutal class conflict, Bolivia is  one of the few countries in the Americas that did not kill off its indigenous majority. Unlike other Latin American countries like Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala, Bolivia has  also  managed to avoid extreme social violence or civil war. We are hopeful that, ultimately, this exceptional Bolivian tradition  is maintained.  But  it  be sorely tested in the months to come.

(c) SubmergingMarkets, BuenaOnda Films, 2007