(Note: The following is an expanded version
of our article that appeared in the July 22, 2008 online edition of The
Nation, available here.)
"For what is the crime of burgling a bank, compared with the crime of building one?"
-- Brecht
The Hearing
Last week in Washington we got a rare look inside the global private
banking industry, whose high purpose it is to gather up the assets of
the world's wealthiest people and many of its worst villains, and
shelter them from tax collectors, prosecutors, creditors, disgruntled
business associates, family members and each other.
Thursday's standing-room-only hearing on tax haven banks and tax
compliance was held by the US Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, chaired by Michigan Senator Carl Levin, a regular
critic of tax havens--except when it comes to offshore leasing
companies owned by US auto companies. He presented the results of his
Committee's six-month investigation of two of Europe's most venerable
financial institutions - LGT Group, the largest bank in Liechtenstein and the personal fiefdom of Crown Prince Hans-Adam II and the royal family, with more than $200 billion in client assets; and UBS, Switzerland's largest bank and the world's largest private wealth manager, with $1.9 trillion in client assets and nearly 84,000 employees in fifty countries, including 32,000 in the United States.Kieber
The theatrics included videotaped testimony by Heinrich
Kieber, a Liechtenstein computer expert in a witness protection program with a $7 million bounty on his head, for supplying a list of at least 1,400 LGT clients - some say more than 4,500 -
to tax authorities in Europe and the United States; two former American
clients of LGT, who took the Fifth Amendment; Martin Liechti, head of
UBS international private banking for North and South America, who'd
been detained in Miami since April, and who also took the Fifth;
Douglas H. Shulman, our sixth IRS commissioner in eight years, who
conceded that
offshore tax evasion must be a "serious, growing" problem even though the IRS has no idea how large it is; and Mark
Branson, CFO of UBS's Global Wealth Management group, who apologized
profusely, pledged to cooperate with the IRS (within the limits of
Swiss secrecy) and surprised the Committee by announcing that UBS has
decided (for the third time since 2002) to "exit" the shady business of
providing new secret Swiss accounts to wealthy Americans.
There were also several other potential witnesses whose
importance was underscored by their absence. Peter S. Lowy, of Beverly Hills, another former LGT client who'd been subpoenaed, is a key member of the Westfield Group, the world's largest shopping mall dynasty,
which has interests in and operates 55 US malls and 63 others around
the world with a combined value of more than $60 billion, holds the
lease for a new shopping mall at the reconstructed World Trade Center, has many other properties in Australia and Israel, and was recently awarded a L3 billion project for the UK's largest shopping mall, in time for the 2012 Olympics.
His lawyer, the renowned Washington fixer Robert S.
Bennett,
reported that Lowy was "out of the country" and would appear later,
probably also just to take the Fifth. Perhaps he traveled to Australia,
where his family is also reportedly facing an LGT-related tax audit. (Bennett's law partner, David Zornow, the head of Skadden, Arps' White Collar Crime practice, represents UBS's Liechti.)
Steven D. Greenfield, a leading New York City toy vendor and private equity investor whose business had been personally recruited by the Crown Prince's brother, went AWOL and did not bother to send a lawyer.
LGT Group declined to follow UBS's contrite example and also failed to appear.
Also missing from the roster were two prominent UBS executives: Robert Wolf, CEO of UBS Americas, who has reportedly raised over $500,000 for Barack Obama, bundled more than $370,850 for
him this year from his bank alone, making UBS Obama's fifth-largest
corporate donor, and had private dinners with the junior Senator from
Illinois; and former Texas Senator Phil Gramm, vice chairman of UBS Securities LLC, a leading lobbyist for UBS until March, and until recently,
John McCain's senior economics adviser. (In 1995, while preparing his
own ultimately-unsuccessful race for the Republican Presidential
nomination, Gramm commented memorably, "I have the most reliable friend you can have in American politics, and that's ready money.")
While neither of these UBS executives have been directly implicated
in the tax scandal, both might reasonably be questioned about precisely
what the rest of UBS in the States knew about the Swiss program, what
it implies for US tax policy, and whether those who complain about
UBS's knowing facilitation of tax fraud are just whining.
While they were on the subject of offshore abuses, the Senate might
also have wanted to depose former top McCain fundraiser James Courter,
who also resigned last week, after it was disclosed that his telecom
firm, IDT, had been fined $1.3 million by the FCC for using a haven
company in the Turks and Caicos to pay bribes to former Haitian
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
The Cases
This crowded docket, combined with the UBS mea culpa, almost
distracted us from the sordid details of the Levin Committee's actual
findings.
UBS: UBS opened its first American branch in 1939, and for all we
know, has likely been facilitating tax fraud ever since, but the Senate
investigation focused only on 2000 to 2007. During this period, even as
UBS was sharply expanding its onshore US operations by acquiring Paine
Webber, expanding in investment and retail banking, it also mounted a
top-secret effort to recruit wealthy Americans, spirit their money to
Switzerland and other havens and conceal their assets from the IRS.
This program, aimed at people with a net worth of $40 million to $50
million each, was staffed by fifty to eighty senior calling officers
and 1,000 client advisors. Based in Zurich, Geneva, and Lugano, each
officer made two to ten surreptitious trips per year to the United
States, calling on thirty to forty existing clients per visit and
trying to recruit new ones by attending HNW (high net worth) watering
holes like Miami's Art Basel and the UBS Regatta in Newport. By 2007,
this program had garnered 20,000 American clients, with offshore assets
at UBS alone worth $20 billion.
To achieve these results, UBS established an elaborate formal
training program, which coached bankers on how to avoid surveillance by
US customs and law enforcement, falsify visas, encrypt communications,
secretly move money in and out of the country and market security
products even without broker/dealer licenses.
Meanwhile, back in 2001, UBS had signed a formal "qualified
intermediary" agreement with the US Treasury. Under this program, it
agreed either to withhold taxes against American clients who had Swiss
accounts and owned US stocks, or disclose their identities. However,
when UBS's American clients refused to go along with these
arrangements, the bank just caved in and lied to the US government.
Eventually, it concealed 19,000 such clients, partly by helping to form
hundreds of offshore companies. This cost the US Treasury an estimated
$200 million per year in lost taxes.
In early July 2008, a US court approved a "John Doe" subpoena for
UBS, demanding the identities of these 19,000 undisclosed clients.
However, as of last week's Senate hearing, UBS has refused to disclose
them. While it maintains that it is no longer accepting new Swiss
accounts from Americans, it is also insisting on the distinction
between "tax fraud" and "tax evasion," reserving full disclosure only
for cases involving criminal tax fraud, which is much harder to prove
under Swiss law. This means it may be difficult to ever know whether it
has kept its commitments.
Ultimately UBS got caught, not by virtue of diligent law
enforcement, much less the Senate's investigation, but by sheer
accident. In late June, Bradley Birkenfeld, a senior private banker
who'd worked with UBS from 2001 until late 2005 out of Switzerland, and
then continued to service the same clients from Miami, pleaded guilty
to helping dozens of wealthy American clients launder money. His name
surfaced when his largest client, Igor Olenicoff, a Russian emigré
property developer from Southern California, was accidentally
discovered by the IRS to be reporting much less income tax than he
needed to justify his $1.6 billion measurement on the Forbes 400 list
of billionaires.
With Birkenfeld's help, Olenicoff succeeded in parking several
hundred million of unreported assets offshore--including millions in
accounts controlled by a Bahamian company that he said had been set by
former Russian Premier Boris Yeltsin. Ultimately, Olenicoff settled
with the IRS for $52 million in back taxes, one of the largest tax
evasion cases in Southern California history, and also agreed to
repatriate $346 million from Switzerland and Liechtenstein. In theory
he faced up to three years of jail time, but--following standard US
practice of going easy on big-ticket tax evaders who have no
"priors"--he received only two years probation and three weeks of
community service.
As noted, Olenicoff also gave up his UBS private bankers, including
Birkenfeld, who plead guilty in June to facilitating tax fraud and is
now awaiting sentencing--the first US prosecution of a foreign private
banker in history. It was Birkenfeld's revelations, in turn, that led
to the disclosure of UBS' program for wealthy Americans, and at least
one-half of the Senate investigation.
The most important point is that this entire program would clearly
have been impossible without the knowledge and approval of the bank's
most senior officials in Switzerland, and probably some senior US
executives as well -- although the Committee did not press this point.
As former UBS CEO Peter Wuffli once said, "A company is only as ethical
as its people." From this standpoint, we have reason to be concerned
that UBS's behavior may repeat itself, so long as so many of these same
senior executives remain in place.
LGT: For all its pretensions to nobility, Liechtenstein is
well-known in the trade as the "place for money with the stains that
won't come out," a flexible jurisdiction whose "trusts" and
"foundations" are basic necessities for everyone from Colombian drug
lords and the Saudi royals to the Suhartos, Marcoses, Russian
oligarchs, and Sicilian mafia.
As detailed by the Senate investigation, LGT Group has certainly
lived up to this reputation in the US market. It maintained a program
that was, if anything, even more sophisticated and discreet than that
of UBS for large fortunes. Among its specialties: setting up conduit
companies in bland places like Canada, allowing clients to transfer
money without attracting attention; leaving the designation of
"beneficiaries" up to corporations controlled by potential
beneficiaries themselves, a neat way of avoiding "know your customer"
rules; rarely visiting clients at home, let alone mailing, e-mailing,
or phoning them, certainly never from a Liechtenstein post office,
Internet address, or area code; shifting the names of trust
beneficiaries to very old folks just before death to make it look like
a repatriation of capital was an inheritance.
In terms of precise trade craft, indeed, LGT had it all over UBS. It
only really got caught red-handed when it tried to modernize and
trusted Heinrich Kieber, a fellow citizen and IT expert ,who turned out
to be either a valiant whistleblower, a well-paid extortionist (he was paid $7.5 million by the German IRS alone for his DVDs), or both.